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Brexit in Sunderland: The Production of Difference and Division in the UK Referendum 
on EU Membership 
 
Abstract 
There is a growing narrative that the outcome of the UK referendum on European Union 
membership was the product of disenfranchisement and disillusionment wrought by the uneven 
consequences of economic restructuring in different UK regions, cities and communities. Those 
most likely to vote ‘leave’ were concentrated among those ‘left behind’ by globalisation, whilst 
those voting ‘remain’ were clustered within more affluent areas and social groups. These uneven 
geographies of leave and remain voting have been taken to reveal two diametrically opposed 
groups in British politics, obscuring the messy and contradictory ways in which votes are cast. In 
seeking to bring these complexities to light, this paper explores the motivating factors behind the 
Brexit vote amongst older working-class white men in Sunderland, England. The paper shows how 
economic stagnation and the experience of different forms of marginality led to a nostalgia for 
times past and a mistrust of political elites amongst this cohort. The paper documents how the 
feelings expressed by research participants became linked to the EU project and its real and 
perceived impacts on the local area. In doing so, it shows that the referendum shaped and changed 
the electorate by asking them to align themselves with those either for or against Britain’s 
membership of the EU. The paper concludes by reflecting on the possibilities for creating an 
inclusive form of politics that treats different responses to the referendum question as the basis 
for an open conversation about democracy and democratic ideals. 
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Brexit in Sunderland: The Production of Difference and Division in the UK Referendum 
on EU Membership 
 
Introduction 
Against a backdrop of austerity, rising inequality and in-work poverty, the 2016 UK referendum 
on EU membership is widely seen to have laid bare the political and economic imbalance within 
the country. Five years after the Occupy Movement of 2011, a middle class urban protest that 
brought the widening gap between rich and poor to the public conscious, the ‘Brexit’ vote (as the 
referendum has become known) served to illustrate the geography of polarisation within the UK 
(Clarke et al., 2017). While London, Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to remain, the rest of 
the country voted to leave the EU, with the vote for Brexit strongest in the band of areas that run 
down the east of England, taking in parts of Lincolnshire, Essex and the East Midlands (Short, 
2016). These are areas where economic and political restructuring over the past 40 years has served 
to marginalise industrial declining and disadvantaged rural areas. In particular, the Brexit vote 
cemented the division between voters residing in London and the prosperous cities of Edinburgh, 
Cambridge, Oxford, Brighton, Glasgow, St Albans, Bristol, Aberdeen and Manchester (all of 
which voted to remain in the EU) and those living in small towns and the countryside (where the 
majority votes to leave were recorded). David Goodhart’s (2017) controversial analysis of the vote 
seeks explanation through a schism between the ‘anywheres’, those footloose, often urban 
members of the electorate that he identifies as socially liberal and university educated, and the 
‘somewheres’, who he says remain rooted in a specific place or community where social 
conservatism and low education levels are the norm (see also Grey (2016) who distinguishes 
between the voting preferences of what Gouldner (1958) terms ‘cosmopolitans’ and ‘locals’ in the 
EU referendum). Goodhart posits that the vote for Brexit was a product of the growing discontent 
amongst the ‘somewheres’ with the globalised world they see around them. Others, however, have 
challenged the depiction of ‘vote leavers’ as the left behind – educationally and financially – noting 
that the leave vote is far from the expression of a singular and conscious working class (Antonucci 
et al., 2017). Moreover, social malaise affects ample sections of the population including those who 
have intermediate or upper-intermediate levels of education, stable jobs and median levels of 
income, but nonetheless face increasing difficulties in maintaining the lifestyles to which they have 
become accustomed and desire (MacLeavy and Manley, 2018). 
 
It is also posited that rather than revealing a divided nation that already existed, the referendum 
produced division by asking people to vote one of two ways (Elliot, 2017). The superficial 
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appearance of a clear geography to the pattern of votes is the result of the referendum 
fundamentally shaping and changing UK society through the construction of a binary opposition 
between ‘leavers’ and ‘remainers’. People were encouraged to identify with one ‘side’ or another, 
even if they had not previously considered their own views on the EU project or were ambivalent 
towards it. Given that each voter casts their ballot as an individual, the referendum was productive 
at the level of the individual, as well as the aggregate. It shaped individual identities and preferences, 
as much as the political and social world those individuals inhabit. This argument challenges the 
trope of a pre-existing chasm by suggesting that voting produces divisions and identities rather 
than just measuring them. 
 
Goodhart’s (2017) thesis that the outcome of the EU referendum vote was the product of 
disenfranchisement and disillusionment is useful in highlighting the extent to which the increased 
openness of economics, culture and society is in tension with the remaining localised experience 
of everyday life. However, although initially compelling careful interrogation reveals that it does 
not provide insight into why the vote in the provincial towns and regions of England gave a small 
majority to the leave campaign. In other words, why membership of the European Union was 
perceived as the problem rather than the solution to the negative consequences of globalisation 
and the failure of the neoliberal state to ensure an equitable distribution of income and wealth, or 
why EU membership was seen as antithetical to effective political representation. Given that 
Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to remain in the EU the electoral picture is evidently more 
complex than the anywhere/somewhere heuristic conveys when mapped onto England alone. This 
is clear when we consider the issue of national sovereignty, which has been cited as a motivating 
factor behind the vote for Brexit amongst the ‘somewheres’ of England (Glencross, 2016; Morgan, 
2016). Press commentaries in the wake of the EU referendum have pointed towards a sizeable 
proportion of the population that feel they have no voice, no representation, and a mistrust of 
meta-government. As such, they are willing to believe unsubstantiated claims about the benefits 
of the UK leaving Europe, most notably the Leave campaign’s bus message that the UK 
government would be able to allocate an additional £350 million per week to NHS post-Brexit 
(Travis, 2016). For them, the vote for Brexit is a vote for self-determination; a means to bolster 
the authority of the British state to govern itself. Yet for the ‘somewheres’ of the Northern Isles 
of Scotland – where even the Scottish parliament may be perceived as a remote outside body of 
government – we see instead a vote to remain in the EU in a move that is coherent with the ‘no’ 
vote of the 2014 referendum for Scottish independence. In these parts, all options are distant and 
as such there is no impetus to alter the status quo. 
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The EU referendum results thus reveal differing responses to processes of marginalisation 
amongst the ‘somewheres’. While Westminster elite could be painted as of equal distance to the 
residents of strongly pro-Brexit towns in the East of England as they are perceived to be by those 
living in the Orkney and Shetland Islands, there is a clear disjuncture in how the longstanding 
social and economic divide, and the insecurities and alienation with which it is associated, has 
permeated local political culture. Whilst it may have produced ‘empire-lamenting nationalists’ 
(Grey, 2016: 830) in the peripheral English regions, those in the Northern Isles of Scotland 
continue to subscribe to a multidimensional notion of sovereignty. This suggests a need to unpack 
the productive effects of everyday practices such as voting to reveal how people’s identities and 
political preferences are shaped. Specifically, how did the referendum change voter’s pre-existing 
preferences and sort them into two groups that did not exist before? 
 
Focusing on a group of ‘somewheres’, this paper explores the motivating factors behind the vote 
for Brexit. In particular, it engages with the process through which these voters arrived at the 
decision to vote leave or remain, what they believed about the EU project and what voting in the 
referendum meant for them in terms of their identity and future relations with others. The voters 
recruited were working-class constituents from Sunderland in the North East of England. All were 
white men aged 50 and over with a history of work in routine and semi-routine jobs in city. This 
cohort is seen as emblematic of the vote leavers as a result of Lord Ashcroft’s survey, which 
suggested voters of this demographic were much more likely to vote leave than remain (Ashcroft 
and Culwick, 2016), as well as geographical analysis prior to the referendum which predicted a 
large majority vote for Britain to leave the EU amongst Sunderland’s older generation (Manley et 
al., 2016). The decision to focus on older working class white men instead of/not in addition to 
women was made on the basis of evidence of gender-differentiated voting patterns and behaviours 
as shown by analysis of the British Election Study whereby older males with few educational 
qualifications were the most likely to vote leave (see Johnston et al., forthcoming). Economically 
independent women were more likely to vote remain, whilst those dependent on a male partner 
tended to vote in line with his political preferences (Zucherman, 2017). While men tend to vote 
independently, women’s votes are not always an independent variable and may simply embody the 
needs and expectations of their partners (Strøm, 2012). 
 
In November 2016, twenty-five interviews were conducted alongside two focus groups. The first 
focus group had seven participants, the second focus group had three providing for a more detailed 
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discussion of the reasons why representatives from this group of voters decided to vote leave or 
remain. In sum, then, thirty-five men were given the opportunity to reflect on the social and 
economic politics of the Brexit vote, with additional data sought to provide a contextualised 
understanding of each participant’s position on Britain and the EU, including their employment 
status and history. The interviews and focus groups were used to unpack the messy and 
contradictory reasons participants had for voting as they did and the strength of feeling that 
accompanied their votes. Whilst there is a growing body of statistical analyses of the 2016 EU 
referendum vote, including several studies that consider the anywhere/somewhere distinction (e.g. 
Becker et al, 2016; Harris and Charlton, 2016; Lee et al., 2018; Manley et al., 2016; and Swales, 
2016), there is a relative paucity of qualitative data that allows us to explore factors shaping the 
political positions of constituents. The quantification of votes for leave and remain can provide 
insight into the behaviour of the population but such analysis cannot provide insight into the 
individual complexities which underpin those votes (Elliot, 2017). This paper seeks to address this 
lacuna by providing a detailed insight into the stimuli influencing votes amongst this key cohort. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: First, Sunderland is introduced as the totemic city of Brexit, as 
both the first place to announce and somewhere where the overall result – a vote to leave – was 
indicative of the (previously unexpected) level of support for the leave campaign at a national level. 
In introducing our case study, we provide a methodological overview and outline the key narratives 
from the interviews and focus groups that were conducted. In the next section of paper, we outline 
how our data suggest that the referendum result was the outcome of a nation-building project in 
which white working-class identities were reconstructed as the referendum campaign encouraged 
voters to connect the experience of economic inequality with issues of race and migration, as 
opposed to neoliberal modernisation and the implementation of austerity measures (Jackson, 2016; 
see also Haylett, 2001). Then, we explore the gender politics of the referendum debate and the 
extent to which different groups were incorporated and excluded in the imagination of British 
citizenship by the Leave campaign. This latter section of the paper reflects on the binary 
construction of ‘leavers’ and ‘remainers’ and what these labels means in terms of future political 
debate. With opinions on the EU creating two kinds of voter, the possibilities for creating a more 
inclusive form of class politics that links growing economic inequality back to its origins in 
neoliberal ideology and policies are open to question (Clarke and Newman, 2017; Emejulu, 2016; 
see also Gilroy, 2005). 
 
The iconic city: Sunderland as symbol of political-economic disconnect 
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Sunderland was the city that announced Brexit to the world in the early hours of 24 June 2016 
with 61% of the referendum vote in favour of Britain leaving the EU. The success of the Leave 
campaign in this Labour heartland was far greater than any pollster had predicted and there 
followed a huge drop in the value of sterling on the currency markets as it became clear that the 
result in Sunderland was indicative of the majority support for Brexit in the UK. Soon labelled ‘the 
city that crashed the pound’ (Geoghegan, 2016: n.p.), Sunderland became the focus of a number 
of media reports that sought to uncover why the UK had become so Eurosceptic (e.g. De Freytas-
Tamura, 2016; Islam, 2016). Of particular interest was the reasons why residents of this city had 
on the face of it ‘voted against their own interests’ (De Freytas-Tamura, 2016). Sunderland had 
long been reliant on shifts in the global economy, from the demise of the shipyards and pits that 
had once provided lifelong employment and job certainty in the North East region, Sunderland to 
the more recent inward investments for its manufacturing base. It is home to more than 80 foreign-
owned companies employing 25,600 people from cities across the region (Newcastle, Durham, 
Hartlepool, even Middlesbrough). For instance, the Nissan car plant provides over 7,000 jobs with 
a further 32,000 in its supply chain. Buttressed by European Structural and Investment Funds 
(ESIF), which provide financial support for the North East Strategic Economic Plan (that seeks 
to improve employment opportunities in the region through investment in business infrastructure 
and skills development), manufacturing companies have located in the city to benefit from the 
strategic investments as well as tariff-free export from the UK to the rest of Europe. Indeed, 
Nissan – one of the North East’s largest employers – made the importance of Britain’s position in 
the EU clear in the run up to the referendum, leading to uncertainty around the future location of 
the company and continuation of employment in Sunderland should a vote to leave be returned. 
 
Yet despite such threats, the people of Sunderland celebrated the Leave campaign victory in the 
early hours of the morning. The high level of support for Brexit in Sunderland and other 
‘somewhere’ parts of the UK has been widely attributed to the deep regional divide in UK 
economy and society, because of the manner in which support for Leave and Remain campaigns 
cut across lines of age, income, education and even party (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). Certainly, the 
voting patterns belie attempts to provide a simple story of a vote driven by traditional class conflict 
and point instead towards the role of culture and geography in voter support for the EU (Elliot, 
2017; Kaufman, 2016; see also Hacking’s (2009: 104) discussion of ‘kind-making’). At an aggregate 
level, analysis that suggests that the Brexit vote was delivered by the ‘left behind’, a heterogeneous 
grouping united by a general sense of insecurity, pessimism and marginalisation (Goodwin and 
Heath, 2016: 331, emphasis added). What is interesting, then, is how the EU referendum 
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intervened in different kinds of spatial and social histories produce leave or remain voters (Jackson, 
2016). In the context of Sunderland, the outcome has been attributed to a disenfranchised majority 
voting in ‘protest’ to political and economic transformations that have denigrated and 
disadvantaged the three lower socio-economic groups (the C2DE group) (Sensier and Devine, 
2017). De Freytas-Tamura (2016) posits that the referendum result in Sunderland is indicative of 
long-suppressed grievances amongst the Northern working-class in relation to economic 
restructuring, welfare reform and migration. Others note the role of the modernisation of the 
Labour Party instigated by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown that fuelled the rise of the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP) by alienating Labour’s working-class base in a context where 
government discourse on welfare and the economy became increasingly removed from a 
Marshallian ideal of social inclusion (Gray, 2017; Clarke et al., 2017). The rise of UKIP 
demonstrated to a broader section of the population that it is still possible to vote in opposition 
to an excessive concentration of economic activity and actors in the large post-industrial cities of 
the South of England, as well as London’s progressive ‘decoupling’ from the UK economy, with 
the referendum serving as a tipping point. 
 
With supply-led development interventions intended to help declining and lagging regions 
generally considered to have failed, cities like Sunderland have become increasingly dependent on 
transfers and welfare from central or European government. Despite massive public expenditure, 
Sunderland is one of many cities in the North and East of England that have experienced a 
‘hollowing out’ of the labour market with a notable shift from manual but skilled work to unskilled 
jobs (Holmes and Mayhew, 2015). The existence of these permanently assisted and sheltered 
economies has resulted in moves to focus development policy on the largest and most successful 
agglomerations further reinforcing the historic North-South divide (McCann 2016; Rodríguez-
Pose, 2018). Unsurprisingly perhaps, the experience of marginality has led to a perception that 
‘change is loss’ in the former industrial cities and regions of the UK. Immigration is feared for its 
potential employment impact rather than celebrated for its economic and cultural contributions. 
Political transformations – the rise of the professional politician and the demise of the unions – 
are lamented for increasing the sense of distance between the local electorate and those in 
influential political roles. 
 
Using a qualitative research approach comprised of semi-structured interviews and focus groups 
organised with the help of staff in four social clubs within the city and held mainly on their 
premises in backrooms or quiet areas of the bar, our research sought to uncover the experiences 
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that helped to shape the voting positions of constituents in Sunderland. Our particular focus was 
on working-class white men aged between 50 and 85 years of age, identified from Lord Ashcroft’s 
survey of 12,369 referendum voters (the largest sample available) to be most likely to have voted 
to leave EU (Ashcroft and Culwick, 2016; a finding confirmed by Johnston et al., 2016; Johnston 
et al., forthcoming). As Gidron and Hall (2017) note, this cohort has experienced depressed 
income and job security in recent years, paving the way for the acceptance of a new cultural frame 
for interpreting society and their position within it. Participants were recruited using a snowball 
sampling method that started from the four social clubs and proceeded to enrol those in the 
demographic in the research. Of the 35 participants, just one identified himself as remain voter. A 
further two declined to say how they had voted, but the rest of the participants were open about 
their decision to vote leave. One of us (Bromley-Davenport) was responsible for the fieldwork 
and chose not to disclose how he had voted in the referendum in order to facilitate more open 
discussion with participants. Interviews and focus groups were recorded and transcribed, then 
analysed using emic and etic codes, which were then collated across the transcripts for analysis 
(Bryant and Charmaz 2007). Previous research by MacLeavy on the gendered economic geography 
of Brexit and Manley on the impacts of inequality on election outcomes including the referendum 
influence the argument developed in the paper to some extent, though the new material gained in 
the course of the fieldwork provided a whole new perspective on elections as events that shape 
and change the societies in which they take place. 
 
Three key themes were identified from the qualitative data: economic stagnation, marginalisation 
and mistrust. The first references problems of growing inequality and stalled social mobility, which 
became connected to the rejection of a post-national Europe through the promotion of a story of 
‘white victimhood’ by the Leave campaign (Emejulu, 2016). The data particularly illuminate how 
the transformation of the job market into an hour glass shape through the ‘hollowing out’ of 
middle rank jobs has produced division whilst reducing financial security for a majority of workers 
(West and Nelson, 2013). Importantly whilst there have been new jobs created in Sunderland, the 
replacement of posts in the city’s shipyards and mines by employment in its manufacturing plants 
has not been at the same level of skill. Indeed, there are relatively more low-skilled production jobs 
and fewer more-skilled roles in the city than there were a few decades ago and this has had an 
impact on the lifestyles of average earners. Against this background, the second and third themes 
of marginalisation and public mistrust denote the disenfranchisement of participants and the 
disbelief that the political economic system is doing something for ‘ordinary’ working-class men. 
Whilst it might appear from the outside that it is – for instance on account of the ESIF the city 
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has received – it was clear from our research the city’s transition from coal-mining and shipbuilding 
to export manufacturing has been far from smooth for its displaced workers. The core export 
businesses that the ESIF funding was used to attract were never intended solely for Sunderland 
and unemployment in the city persists as firms recruit from across the North East region. 
 
Both the interview and focus group data make clear that there is a gulf between supporters of the 
Remain and Leave campaigns and this in part reflects the change in the volume and distribution 
of jobs in the last century. Technology and competition from abroad removed secure working-
class jobs, just as the digital revolution is currently reducing the availability of secure, middle-class 
employment (reducing financial rewards for those in the middle and concentrating wealth at the 
very top – see MacLeavy and Manley, 2018). The outcome of this is a growing divide between 
those in employment that allows them to access a reasonably sized house, a decent education for 
their children and a reliable pension, and those with poorly paid and/or insecure employment 
posts that feel that have no control for the circumstances they now find themselves in. Importantly 
the polarisation of the jobs market has been accompanied by cultural and political changes that 
have contributed to the marginalisation or de-politicisation of the working-class experience of 
economic inequality. Once well-represented through the unions and the Labour Party prior to its 
modernisation, the working-class now suffer from a lack of voice, lack of representation, and non-
inclusion in the elite-dominated institutions that decide things in and for the UK. Although the 
structural inequalities that deny the working-class access to opportunities, resources and power are 
not particular to our cohort, UKIP and the broader Leave campaign used the 2016 EU referendum 
to justify a gendered politics of white self-interest that galvanised a majority of those in Sunderland to 
vote Leave. We use this term in reference to the political views that took hold in the run up to the 
referendum, which prompted voters in declining areas to vote leave in opposition to a system that 
they perceived had quashed their labour market capabilities through the reconfiguration of the 
gender and race order.  The deterioration in what had been the normative or standard employment 
relationship for white men was associated with EU policy supporting the growing diversity of the 
labour market. 
 
Economic stagnation and the changing political landscape 
Sunderland’s industrial past was a recurring theme in interviews and focus group discussions. 
Research participants often referenced the local and regional impacts of the Thatcherite ideology 
of privatisation, cuts and deregulation, which have guided governments under both Conservative 
and Labour leadership for the past 30 years. Although the Labour party had recently seen a change 
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in leadership with the election of Jeremy Corbyn in September 2015, his socialist democratic views 
had done little to change the perception that neoliberal policies have been accepted right across 
the mainstream of British politics: from the Thatcherites who still dominate the Conservative 
party, to the Labour party following its recreation under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, as well 
as the increasingly pro-business Liberal Democrats and the Scottish National party (Beckett, 2017). 
Hence the vote to Leave the EU was explained by research participants as a reaction to historical 
legacy of Margaret Thatcher. After all, it was Thatcher as the Leader of the Opposition Party that 
lent her support to the Yes campaign that ensured Britain stayed in the European Community in 
the 1975 referendum. For many interviewees and focus group participants the relationship of 
Britain to Europe was inextricably and adversely linked with the deleterious social and economic 
change that they had witnessed in Sunderland and the North East during and since her prime 
ministership: 
 
What closed Sunderland down was the European Common Market…with the Common Market every 
country is given a job to do and it was Nissan in Sunderland. 
Jeremy, 84, ex-docker 
 
You could walk job to job, trade to trade, company to company, you could get a job off anybody. You’d 
never be out of work until Thatcher took over. 
Peter, 76, ex-construction worker 
 
The unresolved loss of Sunderland’s collieries and shipyards is evident in what Gamble (2015: 3) 
terms the ‘Thatcher myth’ pronounced by the cohort under study. It identifies the extent to which 
constituents exaggerate the agency of individual political figures and downplay the contingency 
and structural contexts in which government policies are implemented. Jeff a 69-year-old welder 
told us that “she [Thatcher] killed everything in this town” and Tom a 72-year-old ex-miner 
reinforced this when he pointed towards the consequences of neoliberalism for “not just 
Sunderland, but the whole of the North East”.  
 
The construction of the Thatcher myth is importantly linked to broader attempts to naturalise the 
neoliberal project on a global scale (Jessop, 2002; Peck and Tickell, 2002). Thus, we heard accounts 
of the changing labour market conditions associated with the modern flexible economy 
underpinned by a distinctive moral construction of social and economic relations that participants 
had realised from contemporary political discourse on the welfare, economy and solidarity. In 
interviews and focus groups research participants connected the public debate around immigration 
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to issues of welfare entitlement and raised issues of fairness, worthiness and moral obligation when 
in receipt of financial support from the state. Indeed, it was not immigration per se that exercised 
the ‘vote leavers’ but rather the potential access of immigrants to welfare funds. As Chris a 66-
year-old mechanic remarked, “If [EU migrants] actually come over and do some work, then that’s 
alright!”. And there was broad agreement that to “claim our benefits and not put anything back 
into the system” (Jeff, a 69-year-old welder) was unjust during the focus group discussion held in 
the Steels Social Club. Research participants said that they found it “ridiculous” that the UK did 
not operate a contribution-based welfare system with two participants giving very personal 
accounts to underpin their views. Frank a 57-year-old ex-miner, who has a neurological disorder, 
explained that his brain worked off a pacemaker in his chest and that he was currently living off 
just under £100 a week (£32.55 basic disability premium plus £62.45 severe disability premium), 
but was under threat of sanctions as a Work Capability Assessment had recently declared him ‘fit 
for work’. Charlie a 66-year-old ex-docker told us during the second focus group at Pennywell 
Comrades that his wife was disabled “but they’ve decided she’s not disabled, so we ain’t getting a 
penny! How is it fair that people can play the system, yet we get nothing?”. 
 
In a context where key political speeches by members of the ruling Conservative party (e.g. 
Cameron, 2015a; 2015b; Duncan-Smith, 2014; Green, 2012) pit a marginalised domestic 
population subject to the aggressive curtailment of welfare rights against immigrant workers from 
the EU publicly charged with ‘damaging the labour market and pushing down wages’ (Cameron, 
2015a), it is unsurprising that there are high level of support for Brexit in places like Sunderland, 
which have been affected by welfare reform even when not subject to high levels of inward 
migration from EU member states. While research participants did not subscribe to or even 
acknowledge the Conservative pronouncements – their view was their view – the interview and 
focus group data point towards the power of political discourse in creating a ‘moral panic’ around 
Freedom of Movement rules by overstating the level of welfare entitlement and take up amongst 
EU migrants. Steve a 54-year-old publican said he believed that “[EU migrants] come here to play 
our system”. Frank was affronted by reports that “They are claiming money for children that don’t 
even live in the country”, whilst Jeff contended that “They will claim our benefits but not put 
anything back into the system”. Subsequent research by the British Election Survey (Prosser et al., 
2016) has highlighted the importance of immigration in the decisions that voters took when 
deciding to vote leave.  
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It is worth noting here that the North East is the region of the UK with the smallest proportion 
of non-British residents (3%), with 2013 figures indicating that there are 40,000 EU migrants and 
42,000 non-EU migrants out of a total population of 2.5 million. Within the region, the local 
authority of Sunderland has the third lowest proportion of non-British residents after Redcar & 
Cleveland and Hartlepool. By contrast, across the whole of the UK the average proportion of non-
British residents is 13% of the population (ONS, 2015). At the same time, Sunderland has the 
fastest depopulation rate of any city, with an estimated 8 per cent of the population having left 
since the 1980s (Islam, 2016). For research participants, then, the concerns about the welfare 
pressures of EU migration stem not from personal encounters with a socially constructed ‘other’, 
but a symbolic struggle regarding national citizenship and belonging that is traced through political 
discourse on welfare reform and Conservative plans to control immigration (e.g. Cameron, 2015a; 
2015b) to the referendum. Indeed, we saw how participants subscribed to the ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
rhetoric of government, drawing lines of inclusion and exclusion with regards to the legitimacy 
claims for financial support from EU citizens residing in the UK: 
 
Up here, you are who you are. We ain’t racist…as long as they’re coming in and putting something into the 
country that’s ok. 
Paul A, 69, ex-steel worker 
 
Amidst a ‘new politics’ of austerity and state retrenchment (MacLeavy, 2011: 355), the movement 
away from collectivised forms of state support to individualised activation and deterrence (in an 
attempt to tackle the perceived problems of voluntary unemployment and welfare dependency) 
had created affinities and divisions amongst the domestic population, and between the domestic 
population in-coming citizens of the EU. Different forms of solidarity (and exclusion) are implied 
and productive mobilisations among people who share the experience of being on the wrong end 
of inequalities and discrimination are inhibited (Khan and Shaheen, 2017) 
 
The configuration of new lines of inclusion and exclusion might be understood – following Balibar 
and Wallerstein (2010) – as a ‘displaced form of class struggle’. Instead of turning against a 
metropolitan multicultural elite, the economically and politically disadvantaged ‘left behind’ turn 
inward. As the dynamics of class discontent amplify pre-existing group differentiation, the 
potential for affinities amongst heterogeneous subaltern groups is lost. How contours of 
equivalence and difference map onto constructions of race and nation is complex. Our data 
indicate that race and class identity helped to shape the political positions of constituents, but not 
in the reductive way that has been suggested in the media. Indeed, it would be erroneous to claim 
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that any of the research participants who voted leave were driven by overt racism. Rather their 
social, economic and political dislocation left them open to persuasion by the promise of economic 
revitalisation upon Britain leaving the EU. Chris explained that to him the vote to leave was based 
on the promise that “we can get back to how it used to be”, while Ronnie a 58-year-old mechanic 
stated, “I want to get the North East back to being self-sufficient. I want the country to become 
more self-sufficient”. 
 
The desire to ‘return’ to a bygone time was frequently articulated by research participants. Harry a 
66-year-old shipyard worker reminisced about the “good old days” when Sunderland “used to have 
a happy buzz about the town” and Frank described a time when on Hilton Road, near the 
Grangetown social club where he was interviewed, “50,000 miners and shipyard workers used to 
walk up and down, morning and night”. In contrast, contemporary Sunderland was described by 
six of our interviewees as a “ghost town” because of the loss of nationalised industry and its supply 
of blue collar jobs that provided solid salaries, as well as an opportunity for workers to develop 
specialised skills. Given the Leave campaign’s appeals to nostalgia for Britain’s industrial past – 
with little if any recognition of the racial and gendered hierarchies that marked that era (and indeed 
continue to structure economy and society in the present conjecture) from either Leave or Remain 
campaigners – the vote for Brexit was logical. A coherent response to the seismic shifts 
experienced by this cohort of voters so that the need to ‘re-voice’ and protest was felt. The world 
in which these men lived had changed around them so quickly that a suggested reversion to when 
things (are recalled as being) clearer was highly appealing. Five months after the vote when our 
data was collected, they still subscribed to this view with research participants stating that they felt 
renewed and recharged by the referendum result and optimistic about the future. 
 
I think we’ll be stronger. It’s not going to happen straight away, but I truly think we will in the long run. 
Paul B, 60, HGV driver 
 
The cost of my wine’s gonna go up. So what? It’s gonna make the English economy more viable, more 
domestic. 
Steven, 54, publican 
 
There was recognition that taking the country back to an ‘imaginary, purer, more wholesome past’ 
(Buruma, 2016) was a vast and perhaps quixotic project, but nonetheless the referendum result 
was significant in plotting a new course for the UK. Frank told us, “It won’t be all sunshine and 
roses, but this is the best decision for your generation in the long run. Mark my words”. His 
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optimism was shared by Paul B who proclaimed, “We’re not the town that broke the pound, we’re 
the town that saved it!”. 
 
Prior to the Brexit vote, Sunderland was notable for speed at which council was able to count a 
(completely predictable) general election result. The confines of the UK electoral system mean that 
general elections are won and lost in key constituencies where the incumbent MP has only a small 
majority. Given the historic strength of Labour support in the city, it is rare that Sunderland 
matters politically. From election to election the only thing that changes in swing terms is the 
margin of labour victory. The EU referendum was different in that the yes/no vote provided an 
opportunity for residents to register disaffection with the status quo and for this to have 
governmental consequences. This was important given that many research participants reported 
that they had felt disenfranchised by the recreation of the Labour Party under Blair and Brown, 
and now found it hard to identify a party that represented their beliefs and interests given Labour 
leader Corbyn’s pro-European stance. As Frank said, “working class lads, coalminers and shipyard 
builders, they’ve lost confidence. They’re disillusioned by Labour and so what they done was, they 
voted for UKIP”. The UKIP, the single-issue party that spearheaded the Leave campaign, 
experienced a groundswell of support as the Labour Party failed to engage the working class 
communities that were once the party’s anchor (Chaffin, 2018). Participants reported that it was 
difficult for them to identify if and how their preferences were met as Labour Party members could 
not agree on a collective approach to key policy areas. While some balked at the imagery and 
language UKIP used, others have turned to the party in what Derek a 60-year old fisherman 
describes as a “rebellion against the establishment”. Having experienced receding employment and 
social mobility prospects, the ‘left behind’ found their values and priorities being pushed to the 
margins of public debate as the Labour Party moved first to the political right and then appointed 
a leader that openly identified with far-left. As they searched for a new political home, participants 
were willing to subscribe to a more restrictive conception of national identity that holds up 
ancestry, compared with the professional middle-classes, that albeit sceptical are broadly at ease 
with immigration, the EU and social liberalism (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). 
 
Marginalisation, mistrust and the fate of the ‘common man’ 
The emergence of UKIP as a national political force did not happen overnight. Since its foundation 
in 1993, it has worked to attract those marginalised by the process of deindustrialisation, which 
atomised the workforce through the loss of unionised industry, rising unemployment and 
replacement jobs characterised by low pay, low skills and often zero hour contracts. With a 
 17 
collective Labour identity no longer fostered in working environments, working class 
consciousness decreased and was further attenuated by changes in the political landscape which 
reduced the dominance of the two major parties in elections (Winlow et al., 2016) As the more 
upwardly mobile, the young, university-educated and professional workers became a primary target 
for Labour and the Conservatives seeking to capture the political centre, those experiencing 
stagnation or downward social mobility, including our cohort of working-class men aged 50 and 
over, felt excluded by a political class in Westminster and Brussels that they view as deceitful, 
indifferent and out-of-touch. As Jim, an 85-year-old ex-fisherman, commented “Tories come left 
and Labour gone right. They’re one and the same now”, while Bertie, a 71-year-old ex-docker 
remarked, “They’re all the same now…They’re all the same these politicians. Don’t trust any of 
them”. The fact that there was no mainstream party reflecting the values of the ‘common man’ 
was a primary reason for the growth of support for UKIP amongst our cohort in Sunderland. The 
referendum with its binary vote decisively revealed the success of the party in broadening its appeal 
to spell out how leaving the EU was the answer to a whole range of issues facing this cohort. 
UKIP sought to represent working-class white men and by focusing on the concerns and furies 
resultant from deindustrialisation was able to capture disenfranchised Labour voters. 
 
In the bid for votes, UKIP and the broader Leave movement constituted class, race and nation. 
Encouraging a particular reading of struggles with and resentment over contracting economic 
opportunity in industrial and post-industrial regions of the UK as specific to older working-class 
white men, the Leave campaign obscured the manner in which structural inequalities prevent all 
members of the working-class from accessing opportunities, resources and power (Khan and 
Shaheen, 2017), as well as the role of the EU as an agent of equality and a ‘neoliberal softener’ 
(MacLeavy, forthcoming). While research participants said that they found UKIP too radical, many 
of them were willing to subscribe to the identity politics espoused by Nigel Farage, a key member 
of Vote Leave, and his positioning of referendum as a moment for affirming the rights and 
entitlements of the ‘common man’ in the face of perceived economic and political marginalisation. 
For instance, Paul said, “I agree with what they’re saying, but I think they…go about it in the 
wrong way”, while Robbie a 63-year-old postman said that although he found UKIP to be too 
extreme in their approach, he concurred with the channelling of economic resentments against the 
EU and the desire to roll back government: “Too right wing some of them [but] the idea is real – 
let’s get our country back”. 
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The support for Brexit in Sunderland underscores the safety for working-class white men in voting 
for Britain to leave the EU and the trade, financial, migration and social policies it has instituted. 
Counter to the discourse of white victimhood, we can see this cohort as being uniquely privileged 
in being able to register their economic grievances without fear of either the racism and intolerance 
that is being unleased by the radical right, or the return to a conservative nationalism that stresses 
the central role of the family and its sustenance by the unpaid work of women as mothers (Hozić 
and True, 2017). Certainly, research participants expressed their aspiration to ‘regain control’ at 
any cost. The desire to leave the EU stemmed from the perception of an ineffective or corrupt 
European parliament, with instances of ‘failure’ cited as reasons to disengage with it rather than 
work to improve its institutions of governance. At the fishing quay with the last remaining 6 
licensed fishing boats in Sunderland, Derek told us, “we can’t fish certain areas of our country yet 
the Spaniards can come in whenever they want!”, while Jim recounted, “I’d be throwing back dead 
fish to meet the quota, whilst these boats using illegal nets are fishing our shores happily. And 
they’ve got bigger quotas than us!”. Matt a 65-year-old fisherman explained how the wish for 
control was based on the feeling of having no control while being subject to EU regulations, “All 
they’ve done is give us law, pull us and push us”. And, having experienced this Chris argued, “it’s 
time this country stood on its own two feet…it doesn’t need some governing body miles away 
telling us what we can and cannee do”. 
 
The struggles and challenges that the participants have experienced within the changing economy 
have clear and tangible impacts. However, the priority afforded in public debate to their anxieties 
about work, immigration and the role of the EU in threatening their livelihood and identity 
distracts attention from the problems others also face as a result of neoliberal fiscal and monetary 
policies that prioritise the ‘anywheres’ of London and the South. By giving precedence to the 
perceived particular experiences of older working-class males, the imaginaries attached to the 
Brexit vote shift focus away from how widespread the experience of economic precarity is in the 
twenty-first century. Economic and political restructuring is delivering heightened insecurity to not 
only blue-collar workers, but also men and women employed in the service industries, small 
business owners and the poor (Piketty, 2014; MacLeavy and Manley, 2018). While political 
discourse highlights the consequences of this for white workers in industrial and post-industrial 
regions of England, there is no account of the unique whiteness or geography of the ‘left behind’ 
effect (Bhambra, 2016). Rather the incorporation and exclusion of different groups in the identity 
politics of UKIP is a product of the insertion of everyday moralities into electoral processes (Koch, 
2017). 
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UKIP and the Leave campaign that the party subsequently championed engaged the ‘somewheres’ 
of our study through the promotion of a gendered politics of white self-interest (see Walley, 2017 
for a comparative account of the ‘demographic reductionism’ of 2016 US Presidential Election).  
In attaching partial and contested imaginaries of Britain and British citizenship to the referendum 
vote, the movement bypassed the extent to which social classes are being realigned as economic 
insecurity is becoming more widespread (Standing, 2011). It channelled frustrations with the lived 
experience of government into anger and acrimony and in doing so limited recognition of the 
underlying causes of the vacuum of employment and money in the local supply chain, including 
the decline of the post-war social contract and the politics of neoliberal austerity (Koch, 2017). 
With increasing numbers of people in Sunderland trapped in the low-pay-no-pay cycle, juggling 
numerous zero-hour contract jobs and/or facing job centre sanctions, the campaign encouraged 
voters to reminisce about a time when local industry provided reasonably well paid and rewarding 
careers that enabled even the young and unskilled to enjoy a modest standard of living. This led 
Tom to connect the area’s decline to Thatcher’s signing of the Single European Act in February 
1986. It was this, he argued, that precipitated the loss of not only jobs but a sense of purpose and 
contribution for men in the North East. He recounted, 
 
They’re now building a bridge for our river. It’s being built in Belgium!! It could have been built here rather 
than dragged across the whole North Sea! 
Tom, 72, ex-miner 
 
Similarly, when talking about the old collieries Paul stated, “Now we buy coal from Russia. How 
daft is that?”. For them the decision to vote leave was based on a hope that Brexit would spur 
domestic production and rejuvenate regional employment prospects for men. Implicit in this 
discussion was a sense that the negative effects of economic restructuring had been compounded 
by EU efforts around equality and women’s rights. Policies to support women’s waged labour 
emerged just as the ‘common man’ was worrying about his pay packet and have since been used 
to legitimise increased welfare conditionality affecting a number of participants. As Jim remarked 
“there was nothing wrong with this country in the 70s”, while John a 68-year old ex-miner 
pejoratively described the EU as being “all do-gooders [and] human rights”. 
 
The rejection of the EU and its capacity to influence domestic policy were indicative of the mistrust 
of politicians as well as the machinery of government. As Steven remarked, “I don’t want them 
deeming what’s right for us or for any country for that matter!”. While the EU has worked to 
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ensure greater equality in productivity and income across regions, there was little recognition of 
efforts to strengthen the prosperity, stability and security of all in Sunderland through financial 
tools or legislation introduced to ensure that men and women benefit equally from policy and 
inequality is not perpetuated. As economic insecurity persists and is felt and observed in the city, 
a view of the EU as an external ‘other’ was communicated by participants. They saw a discrepancy 
between their own experiences of stagnation and decline and EU narratives related to the 
promotion of regional equality, which made them sceptical about the effectiveness of the 
institution and its power to deliver positive change for ‘the man on the street’. This led them to 
question the cost of membership and its contribution to Britain’s growth and development. 
 
The EU…the only people they’re benefiting are those people [EU staff] sat in those offices 
Steven, 54, publican 
 
No one knows where the money has been going all these years…I suspect some of the directors should be 
in jail! 
Jeremy, 84, ex-docker 
 
Although Frank acknowledged financial support received through the EU Health Programme, he 
did not perceive any benefits beyond these infrastructural developments. 
 
We’ve seen nice new hospitals, for example, the RVI in Newcastle – that’s EU funded – but we haven’t felt 
it in our pockets or changes in our standard of living. 
Frank, 57, ex-miner 
 
It was clear that these men felt optimistic about the post-Brexit future. They did not subscribe to 
the view that the EU had delivered positive change, instead advocating the possibilities created by 
the referendum vote to leave. As Bertie proclaimed, “we’re getting 350 million back, aren’t we? 
Think about that! Money in our pocket!” 
 
Conclusion 
The 2016 EU referendum result in Sunderland led to the use of the city as a symbol of a labour 
heartland encouraged to, potentially, sabotage its future economic development by duplicitous 
politicians interested in upholding and developing their parliamentary careers. Yet, our interview 
and focus group data told a somewhat different story. In the aftermath of the Brexit vote as 4 
million people signed a petition calling for a second referendum (HM Government, 2016), we 
found that the Leave campaign’s core electorate – working-class white men aged 50 and over – 
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were content with the result of the ballot. They did not feel ‘duped’ nor a sense of regret as Britain 
started to negotiate its departure from the EU. Rather there was a sense of optimism and relief 
that the referendum vote has provided a conduit for their growing disillusionment, dissatisfaction, 
and anger with a form of politics that has ‘gambled on financial capitalism and European 
integration’ (Evans, 2017: 219). In an era when old divisions between class and related notions of 
a left-right divide are becoming less visible, the referendum distilled a range of (often conflicting) 
emotions and anxieties into two distinct choices for voters that enabled a decision on the future 
governance of the country to be made. 
 
In showing how the referendum vote is deeply connected to a complex set of contexts, histories 
and meanings (Coleman, 2013), the data demands that we pay attention to the way in which 
electoral processes produce division. We need to be careful not to assume the whole country is 
comprised of just two types of people – leavers and remainers – and acknowledge the different 
ways in which people gave meaning to their votes at a time when there was no answer to the 
question of what Brexit itself might mean (Elliot, 2017). To engage fruitfully with the emotions 
that the Brexit vote has galvanised and our research in Sunderland has brought to light we need to 
unpack how different types of voters are borne from individual lived experiences and perceptions. 
By revealing the impact of recent political economic developments on the multitude of 
disenfranchised groups, we can remove the emphasis that is currently being placed on the 
differences between leavers and remainers (to which voters may not necessarily subscribe) and 
focus instead on a more inclusive politics that treats different responses to the referendum 
question as the basis for an open conversation about democracy and democratic ideals that extends 
beyond Britain’s relations with Europe. 
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